We present novel evidence that contracting style and geography matter in financial contracts, in addition to more traditional ingredients based upon financing frictions and formal institutions. We analyze cash flow contingencies included in 1,804 private equity contracts between U.S. venture capitalists (VCs) and U.S. startup companies. These contingencies affect both pricing and incentives. We document a pronounced "California effect", namely, that California based entrepreneurs receive more lenient contract terms. We find a similar effect if the VC is located in California, or if a non-California VC had large exposure the California market. We further show that contracts are less harsh if the startup is located in a region with a larger VC market, or if the geographical distance between the VC and the company is shorter. This latter finding supports the view that geographical proximity can lower monitoring costs. However, the "California effect" remains large and significant even after we control for such explanations. Our findings cannot be explained by differences in state laws, bankruptcy and tax regimes. We also confirm that it is not that VCs substitute less harsh cash flow contingencies for harsher control rights or for more performance-based CEO compensation. In fact, California contracts are more entrepreneur-friendly in all these dimensions. Our findings suggest that in addition to traditional variables, behavioral norms can lead to a contracting equilibrium. In addition to the "California effect", we present several other new findings on VC contract design.
I. Introduction
This paper documents geographically based style variation in the design of private equity contracts. Our findings challenge the accepted theoretical paradigm that equilibrium assignment of cash flows and control rights depends solely on the magnitude of agency and information problems, and on corporate law, legal enforcement, taxation and bankruptcy procedures.
1 Our findings are particularly surprising in light of private equity being the realm of sophisticated, experienced investors.
We introduce and analyze a sample of 1,804 private equity contracts between U.S. venture capitalists and U.S. start-up companies. The sample, which is collected from mandatory legal filings, is several times larger than those analyzed in published papers on U.S. VC contracts Stromberg 2003, 2004; Cumming, 2008; Broughman & Fried, 2010) .
Our main focus is on six key investor-friendly cash flow contingencies, the inclusion of which affects the entrepreneur's incentives as well as the pricing of VC investments. We analyze these contract terms and document a statistically and economically significant "California effect" in VC contracts. In particular, we find that companies headquartered in California, and in particular in Silicon Valley, receive less harsh contracts (i.e.
include fewer investor-friendly contract terms). The magnitude of this effect is very large. For example, forty seven percent of non-California contracts allow VCs to receive cumulative dividends whereas only eleven percent of California contracts include such provisions. Similarly, seventy two percent of non-California contracts give VCs the right to redeem shares in the contract, whereas only thirty two percent of California contracts include such redemption rights clause.
In order to ascertain that the "California effect" is not due to excluded variables or relationships, we include contract theoretical variables, some that have been used before and others that are analyzed here for the first time. We show that the amount invested, company age and VC experience matter in the choice of contracts. However, the "California effect" remains economically and statistically significant even after we control for and explain this variation. Indeed, the difference between California and non-California contracts is larger than any difference based another explanatory variable, including the dummies that capture the company's industry. The inclusion of other explanatory variables in our tests allows us to confirm the findings of earlier work, but on a much larger sample, and also rule out the influence of obvious omitted factors.
Examining the data further, we find that the "California effect" exists not only for company locations but also for VC locations. VCs whose main office is in California write less harsh contracts, regardless of whether they invest in companies headquartered in California or whether the headquarters are located in other 1 There are too many papers to be listed here, however, in the specific context of finance security design papers we can include Townsend (1979) Allen and Gale (1988) , Raviv (1989, 1995) , Madan and Soubra (1991) , Boot and Thakor (1993) , Fluck (1998) , Zender (1991) and in the specific context of venture capital or start up firms also Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) and Ravid and Spiegel (1997) .
that affects an Illinois VC with more California exposure differently than an Illinois VC with less California exposure. In addition to these empirical results, our interviews with legal scholars, lawyers and VC partners confirm the view that the "California effect" in private equity contracting cannot be explained by regional differences in corporate law, legal enforcement, taxation and bankruptcy procedures.
Another candidate explanation to the "California effect" is possible regional differences in company quality or bargaining power of the entrepreneur, which could determine the design of financial contracts. Our analysis presents two findings that contradict this explanation. First, the effect survives a battery of VC, company and round characteristics that have been shown to be good proxies for company quality. Specifically, the "California effect" holds after controlling for the experiences of the company's founding team and the lead VC (Gompers et al, 2009; Sorenson, 2007) , and the amount and pre-money valuation of the investment round.
Second, the regional difference in contract design is not matched with a similar difference in historical outcomes of venture-backed companies. While Silicon Valley companies are more likely to have a successful exit than companies located in other parts of the country, but other California companies are not. Therefore, the pronounced "California effect" that exists also outside Silicon Valley is difficult to reconcile with geographical differences in company quality.
We also test whether the "California effect" can be explained by a more concentrated, and thereby possibly more competitive, regional VC market. We construct different proxies for the regional concentration of VCs and venture-backed companies and find that, similar to Degryse and Ongena (2005) in a different context, concentration indeed matters. However, we continue to find that the "California effect" remains large and significant even in specifications that control for the regional VC market concentration.
We finally check for geographical proximity (See Lerner, 1995 , Tian, 2009 . Indeed, contracts signed between two more distant transaction parties are harsher than contracts signed by two parties who are located near to each other, consistent with prior work. A closer distance is, however, much less important than the "California effect". To illustrate, consider a startup company located in Illinois who must choose between financing offers from VCs in different locations. Our results show that the contract would be less harsh if the entrepreneur chooses a VC located in Illinois, unless the out-of-state VC is headquartered in California.
Overall, the economic significance of the distance effect is about a third of the "California effect".
To summarize, we document a surprising "California effect" in private equity contracting that is large, robust and wide-spread. We test and rule out explanations based upon the traditional determinants of financial contract design and prior geography literature. In particular, the California difference in VC contracts remains after we consider state-wide formal institutions, differences in company quality, the concentration of the regional VC market, and the distance between VC and company.
We conclude by discussing an alternative, and in our view plausible, motivation for why VC contracts in California are markedly less entrepreneur-friendly. In a general sense, our findings are consistent with studies showing that California has a less formal culture as compared with other entrepreneurial regions in the U.S. Saxenian (1996) provides a rich analysis of the cultures in Silicon Valley and on Route 128 in Massachusetts. Both regions were home to major high-tech companies at the start of the recent computer age.
In fact, the high technology employment in the two regions was roughly similar in the mid 70's. Yet, in the 1990s and beyond Silicon Valley has become vastly more successful (figure 1, p. 3 ibid). Saxenian's conclusion is that the Silicon Valley VC market offered more partner-like relationships with entrepreneurs, whereas the VC markets elsewhere took a more banker-like approach to investing. Interviews with lawyers who specialize in VC transactions and entrepreneurs suggest that such regional differences in culture and attitudes are indeed very important.
Although we do not present an empirical test that directly validates of the role of attitudes and culture in private equity contracting, we note that a "friendly equilibrium" is a rational possibility. If attitudes are important and omnipresent, then they should apply broadly to all market participants in a given geographical area. A VC who deviates from the local culture by offering harsher contract terms could find many of her financing offers being rejected by entrepreneurs. This relationship equilibrium idea is supported by the fact that the effect we find applies broadly to all contract dimensions, namely, cash flow contingencies, control rights and CEO performance-based compensation. Finally, a VC's attitudes towards contracting are partly formed by experiences and interactions with other VCs. This can explain why we find that California VCs use more entrepreneur-friendly contracts even when they invest outside California, and why non-California VCs use more entrepreneur-friendly contracts if they have more exposure to the California market. As we discuss in the next section, there are also frictions that impede the harmonization of VC contracts across regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows-the next section provides a literature review where we relate our results to existing studies. The third section describes our data and the coding of VC cash flow contingencies. The fourth section discusses our results pertaining to the "California effect" and the fourth section our results on distance. The sixth section presents evidence of the "California effect" in control rights and CEO compensation contracts. The seventh contains discussions of our main findings. The paper ends with a brief summary and conclusion.
Literature review -Our Contribution in Perspective
The contracts that VCs receive in exchange for their investments are complex and non-standardized, and have been shown to share many of the features predicted by contract theory (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) . As discussed in the introduction, our first, and in our view most important, contribution is documenting a wide spread California contracting effect.
At the same time, our findings extend ideas in other papers, which suggest that the VC setting can be susceptible to regional contracting styles because of a large degree of geographical fragmentation in the U.S.
VC market. VCs often invest locally (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993; Stuart and Sorensen, 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Bengtsson, 2008; Chen et al, 2009 ) and also form strong syndication networks with other local VCs (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007) . Geographical factors may arise from the presence of formal and informal networks between venture-backed companies (Gompers, Lerner & Scharfstein, 2005; Lindsey, 2008) , and trust between VCs and entrepreneurs (Bottazzi et al, 2009 ). Tian (2009 shows that shorter distances between the VCs and the funded firms can lead to better outcomes, supporting the monitoring hypothesis. The fact that many venture investors were themselves previously active as entrepreneurs (Zarutskie, 2008 ) may be another channel through which geographical factors can survive in the VC industry. A theory model by Landier (2001) shows the existence of multiple equilibria can explain differences in how VCs evaluate and contract with entrepreneurs.
Our second contribution is to enhance recent work on the importance of geography in finance. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that portfolios of retail investors are biased towards local companies. Huberman (2001) finds that this higher fraction of local stocks in investor portfolios is primarily due to familiarity with these stocks. In contrast, Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2005) show that retail investors are better informed about local investments and these local investments are associated with higher returns. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) document a similar local bias in the portfolios of mutual fund investors and also show that geographically proximate institutions have information advantages. If both retail and institutional investors bias their portfolios towards local stocks, then a large fraction of the trading volume is likely to originate locally. Kedia and Zhou (2007) show that a large presence of local market makers significantly reduces both quoted as well as effective spreads. Similarly, Malloy (2005) documents how geographically proximate analysts have lower forecast errors and Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan (2008) show that local acquirers have higher returns in mergers and acquisitions. Schultz (2003) shows that geography provides an information advantage in the context of an IPO syndicate. We add to existing studies of geography by documenting a "California effect"
in private equity contracting, and by relating the harshness of a VC contract to the distance between VC and company.
Our third contribution is to present new evidence on the structure of financial contracts used in VC investments. In addition to the geographical factors, we identify several new contract theoretical variables, extending papers such as Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) . Venture-backed companies are important promoters of entrepreneurship, innovation and economic growth. 5 Despite the fact that VCs infused about $360 billion to the economy in 42,000 deals between 1999 and 2008, few studies examine the contractual features of such investments (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1988; Stromberg 2003, 2004; Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2009; Cumming, 2008) . Our findings have important implications for the empirical testing of models of private equity contract design, which explain why different types of convertible preferred equity are used in VC investments (See Berglof, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 2002; Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003; Repullo and Suarez, 2004) .
Our paper also contributes to the small literature that attempts to empirically test the validity of more general contract design theories. In addition to VC studies, contract design theory has been tested in two other broad industries, namely, bio-technology and motion pictures. Bio-technology papers focus on the distribution of various rights between the contracting firms (see for example, Lerner and Merges, 1998) . The film industry is characterized by interesting and complex contracting. There is generally less data available on contract design than for VC or bio-technology contracts, however, outcomes are much more well-known. Chisholm (1997) analyzes several dozen actor contracts and shows that more experienced actors are more likely to receive a share contract, supporting some life cycle compensation theories. Palia et al. (2008) focus on cofinancing agreements and test theories of boundaries of the firm. In other industries there is sparse empirical work on contract design due to data limitations. However, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) , for example, show that better reputation (in Indian software companies) leads to a lower prevalence of fixed payment contracts, which provides more incentives to firms than "contingent" contracts. While each industry is characterized by different institutions, most studies find support for some of the major features predicted by the theory. Our study supports the view that contractual features provide important incentives and it is the first to augment these ideas by showing that contracting choices can also be influenced by geographical factors.
The Data

Sample
A major challenge for empirical research on VC investments is to obtain reliable data on privately-held firms.
We overcome this data limitation and collect detailed information about VC contracts from mandatory legal filings. In order to study geographical differences unrelated to country-wide formal institutions we further restrict our sample to companies with a lead VC headquartered in the U.S. We identify the lead VC as the investor making the largest investment in the round. By virtue of being the largest investor, the lead VC is likely to be the most active investor during the contract negotiations with the entrepreneur.
An overview of our sample is presented in table 1. Our contract data is collected and coded with the help of VCExperts, and covers 1,804 investment rounds in 1,501 unique companies (this type of classification of VC contracts is common in the literature, see for example Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg, 2007) .
Importantly, we restrict our sample to one VC per round because all VCs in that round get the same contract terms. Our sample is the largest sample of VC contracts studied by researchers to date, and is about 10 times as large as the sample used by Stromberg (2003, 2004) Consistent with earlier studies, we find that VCs prefer to invest in companies that are located close to their headquarters. One in five companies is located no more than 5 miles from their lead VC and 46% of companies are located no more than 50 miles apart. 6 We obtain other company and lead VC variables from VentureEconomics, and supplement with hand collected data on the characteristics of the founding team. In addition we use data from VentureEconomics create various measures of the aggregate size of the VC market in a particular geographical area. For about half of our sample, we obtain data from VCExperts and VentureEconomics on the pre-money valuation of the company. The average sample company raised $11 million dollars at a pre-money valuation was $48 million.
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For a subset of our sample we also have data on the contractual allocation of board seats and protective covenants which give VCs the veto rights over important business decisions. We use these data in the analysis later.
Cash Flow Contingencies and Downside Protection Index
Each of the 1,804 unique contracts is coded along six important contractual dimensions, namely, cumulative dividends, liquidation preference, participation, anti-dilution rights, redemption, and pay-to-play. The six contract terms jointly define the cash flow contingencies that are attached to the preferred stock that VCs receive in exchange for their investment. In other words, the contract terms determine the additional cash flow contingencies provided to the holder of one share of preferred stock. As shown by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) most terms that are included in VC contracts are favorable to the VC and especially favorable if company performance is bad. 8 Inclusion of these terms implies that VCs capture in expectation a higher fraction of the company's exit proceeds than is implied by their fractional equity ownership. As a result, the price that VCs pay for their investment is relatively lower if the contract includes more of the cash flow contingencies that we study. Broughman and Fried (2010) , show that contractual contingencies are important determinants of how exit proceeds are split, even though these provisions are sometimes subject to minor renegotiations.
Although VC contracts include other contractual rights as well, the six cash flow contingencies we study are among the most important for determining the payoff distribution between preferred and common shareholders. Also, unlike many other terms in VC contracts, the terms we study exhibit cross-sectional variation. This is important because our goal is to analyze cross-sectional differences in the design of VC contracts. Our interviews with VCs and lawyers who specialize on VC contracts lend support to the view that these cash flow contingencies are critical and often subject to negotiation. Indeed, a number of notable law firms (e.g. Fenwick and West and Wilson Sonsini) list in their quarterly synopsis of VC contract terms summary statistics based precisely on the terms we study.
The exact meaning and economic importance of each cash flow term is described below. Table 2B provides an overview of the contract terms and reports their frequency in our sample. We code each contract term as 0 or 1, 2 based on how favorable it is to the VC, where a value of 2 means that the contract is "harshest" for the existing owners of the company, or alternatively more favorable for the VC who invests in a round. While the six contract terms we study are functionally similar, they may be included or excluded in the contract independently of each other. We aggregate the six binary variables to an index labeled Downside Protection Index (DPI). DPI can take the values 0-11 where 0 is a contract that includes a minimum of investor-friendly cash flow contingencies and 11 is a contract that includes all possible investor-friendly cash flow contingencies 9 . As reported in table 2A, the average value of DPI is 4.96. Since we are interested in the joint contractual allocation of cash flow contingencies, our primary variable of study is DPI. We also study each cash flow right in separate empirical tests.
A Detailed Description of Cash flow Contingencies in VC Contracts
Cumulative Dividends
When the cumulative dividends provision is in force, the VC receives dividends every year until the company is sold or liquidated. Cumulative dividends accumulate and are not paid out in cash to the VC until the company has a liquidation event. 10 The dividends are expressed in percentage terms and are typically compounding, which means that investors also earn dividend on accumulated unpaid dividends. Cumulative dividends are senior to common stock, and the seniority to other classes of preferred stock is specified in the contract. To illustrate how cumulative dividends work, consider the following example: suppose that the VC invests $2 million and receives 8% in compounding cumulative dividends. If the company is sold after 5 years for $10 million, then the VC receives (1.08 5 -1) × $2 million = $0.94 million in dividends.
In our sample, 66% of all contracts include no cumulative dividends (harshness=0). When cumulative dividends are included, the most common dividend rate is 8%. We coded a provision for a divided of 8% or below as 1 and above 8% (6% of the sample) as 2. The distribution of cumulative dividends in our sample is similar to the distribution found in the Kaplan and Stromberg's (2003) sample, where 44% of all financing rounds have cumulative dividends and the median dividend rate is the same as in our paper, 8%.
Liquidation Preference
Liquidation preference is the multiple of the investment amount a VC receives when the company has a liquidation event. Liquidation preference is senior to common stock, and the seniority to other classes of preferred stock is specified in the contract. Thus, for an investment of $2 million, a liquidation preference of 2X means that the VC gets 2 × $2 million = $4 million in liquidation preference. Unlike cumulative dividends, the amount that the VC receives in liquidation preference does not increase over the time. 9 The construction of the index is similar to the construction of indices such as Gompers Ishii Metrick (2003) or Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) . Similar to these studies, our index relies on the relatively naïve aggregation method of counting functionally distinct features. 10 A liquidation event could be a merger, acquisition, bankruptcy or other dissolution of the company. Almost all VC contracts include "auto-conversion rights" which if the company goes public forces an automatic conversion of the VC's preferred stock to common stock (thus annulling all special contract terms).
The majority of all contracts, 93%, have a 1X liquidation preference (harshness=0) and only 6% have above 1X. We coded 17 contracts (1%) that had a liquidation preference greater than 2 as 2 (the harshest). The liquidation preference is not reported by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) .
Participation
Almost all VC investors receive convertible preferred stock. If the preferred stock is not participating, the VC effectively holds a convertible and has the option, at the time of the liquidation event, of receiving either the liquidation preference or converting the preferred stock to common stock. The fraction of common stock that the VC receives is determined by dividing the VC's investment amount by the post-money valuation of the round.
To illustrate how (non-participating) convertible preferred stock works, suppose the VC invests $2 million at $4 million post-money valuation with a 1X liquidation preference. When the company is sold, the VC can either claim $2 million in liquidation preference or 50% (2/4) of the common stock. The VC would choose to convert if and only if the proceeds from the company are above $4 million. If the preferred stock is participating, the VC does not have to choose between the liquidation preference and between converting the preferred stock to common stock but instead receives both. Building on the example, participating preferred stock would give the VC both $2 million and 50% of the common equity. If the company is sold for $3 million then the VC receives $2 million in liquidation preference and $0.5million in common stock (50% of the remaining $1 million).
Participation can either be unconditional, as described above, or conditional on the amount of VC cash flows. If the participating preferred stock is "capped", the VC always gets the common stock but receives the liquidation preference only if the VC's cash flows are below a specified multiple or return hurdle, calculated with the VC's investment as base. To illustrate the effects of capped participation, suppose that the participation is capped at a 3X gross investment multiple. If the company is sold for $4 million the VC would receive with participation $3 million. Because the gross multiple is 1.5 (3/2) the VC also gets the liquidation preference. However if the company is sold for $18 million the VC would receive with participation $2 million in liquidation preference and $8 million in common stock (50% of $16 million), i.e. a total of $10 million.
Because this would correspond to a gross return of 5X (10/2), which is above the specified 3X, the VC does not receive the liquidation preference. The total cash flows to the VC are instead $9 million (50% of $18 million).
In our sample, 32% of contracts have (non-participating) convertible preferred stock (harshness=0) and 24% have capped participating preferred stock (harshness=1). For 44% of the contracts the participation is not capped (harshness=2). Participation is less common in the Kaplan and Stromberg sample with 39% of all contracts having capped or uncapped participating preferred stock.
Anti-Dilution
If anti-dilution is included in the contract, the VC is issued more preferred stock if and only if the share price of a follow-up financing round is below the share price that the VC paid in the earlier financing round. Hence, anti-dilution only comes into effect when the company raises a follow-up round at a lower valuation. Antidilution comes in two forms, weighted average and full ratchet. Compared with weighted average anti-dilution, full ratchet is more generous to the VC by issuing more preferred stock, especially if the new financing round is small relative to the previous round.
Anti-dilution seems to be almost a boiler-plate provision in VC contracts with only 2% of all contracts having no anti-dilution (harshness=0). Weighted average is most common and found in 89% of all contracts (harshness=1), while only 9% of contracts have full ratchet anti-dilution (harshness=2). The Kaplan and
Stromberg sample has a somewhat wider distribution of anti-dilution with 5% of contracts having no antidilution, 73% weighted average and 21% full ratchet.
Redemption
Redemption gives the VC the right to sell back his preferred stock to the company after a specified number of years. Redemption follows a specified schedule where for example 1/3 of the stock is sold 5 years after the investment, 1/3 after 6 years and the remaining 1/3 after 7 years. In practice, the redemption option is only exercised by the VC if the company is not close to a liquidation event. In this situation the company is unlikely to repay the VC the investment amount so redemption effectively forces the company into bankruptcy.
Redemption is not included in 42% of the sample contracts (harshness=0) and included in 58% (harshness=1). Redemption is more common in the Kaplan and Stromberg sample and found for 79% of the contracts that they study.
Pay-To-Play
The final contract term that we code is pay-to-play, which unlike the other terms is not favorable to the VC.
When pay-to-play is included in the contract, a VC that chooses to not invest in follow-up financing rounds of the company is forced to give up some or all of the control and cash flow contingencies that are attached to the preferred stock. Thus, pay-to-play only matters when the VC does not invest in a follow-up round.
It could be argued that pay-to-play should not be included in DPI because this contract term only affects how cash flows are split if the VC does not invest in follow-up rounds. VCs typically continue as investors, so that pay-to-play may have limited implications in practice. Our empirical analysis of separate cash flow contingencies shows that our main result -that California contracts are less investor-friendly -would actually be stronger if we did not include pay-to-play in DPI.
Pay-to-play is not included in 83% of the sample contracts. Because the VC benefits from not including pay-to-play in the contract, these contracts are coded as most "harsh" (harshness=2). Pay-to-play either involves the VC losing some contractual rights, typically anti-dilution, and converting to preferred (harshness=1), or losing all contractual rights forcing her to convert to common stock (harshness=0). Pay-toplay is not reported by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) .
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The Importance of Cash flow Contingencies in VC Contracts
Before presenting our empirical results pertaining to contract design and geography, we need to make a few remarks about the economic importance of cash flow contingencies in VC contracts. As discussed above, each of the cash flow contingencies that we study translates in its own unique way into downside protection for the VC. Specifically, the contract always gives the VC both a payoff from its fractional equity holding and an additional payoff implied by the various cash flow contingencies. Harsher cash flow contingencies are associated with a larger such additional payoff, and particularly so in states of the world where company performance is bad.
The first implication of harsher cash flow contingencies is that such a contract, similar to a standard debt contract, gives the entrepreneur stronger monetary incentives (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003) . The additional payoff to the VC represents a relatively large fraction of the total proceeds from an unsuccessful company outcome but a relatively small fraction from a successful outcome. If the company were to go public with sufficiently high IPO proceeds, then the VC would not be entitled to any additional payoff (because of a contractual provision called "Automatic Conversion"). All else equal, a higher DPI implies that the entrepreneur has more to gain from taking actions that increase the likelihood of company success.
12
The distribution of payoffs in different states of the world also affects the VC's incentives to monitor and provide value-adding services (Casamatta, 2003; Schmidt, 2003; Repullo and Suarez, 2004) . The stronger downside protection associated with higher DPI means that the VC has less to gain from taking such actions.
Thus, the harshness of a VC contract is important because it affects both the entrepreneur's and the VC's incentives.
The second implication of harsher cash flow contingencies is a lower implied pricing of the VC investment (because the VC is entitled to a higher expected payoff). Existing studies of VC investments pricing typically rely on reported data on pre-money valuations. Since this metric does not account for the pricing implications of contractual cash flow contingencies, it understates the actual price VCs pay and thereby also understates the venture-backed company's cost of capital. The results on contract harshness that we document in this paper imply that the understatement of VC investment pricing is subject to considerable geographical variation. In particular, the "California effect" means that the "correct" pricing of investments associated with the California VC market is closer to the pre-money valuation than the pricing of investments in other regions.
As an illustration, suppose that an empirical study finds that companies headquartered in the Silicon Valley receive on average the same pre-money valuation as companies headquartered in New York City. Our findings suggest that the full economic price of New York companies is actually lower, since California contracts have a much lower DPI. 
Cash Flow Contingencies and "California Effect"
We now proceed to an analysis of geography and cash flow contingencies. We first study the relationship between contract harshness and geographical location, and then proceed in section 5 to include study the relationship between contract harshness and geographical distance.
Downside Protection Index, Univariate Analysis
Table 3 provides the first data classification which documents the strong geography component which we call the "California effect". In panel A we present univariate comparisons of our downside protection index,
showing that both VC and company location matter for contract design. VCs in California tend to offer much better terms for entrepreneurs, and companies based in California also tend to receive better terms. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) also find that a California location of the VC affects contract terms. In their case, California contracts use less explicit performance benchmarks and also have lower claims for the VC and less redemption rights, consistent with our findings.
The "California effect" on contract design is economically large, and particularly so if the company and VC are both located in the Silicon Valley-such contracts are more than one DPI unit less investorfriendly than a contract between a company and VC that are both located outside the Silicon Valley. This geographical difference represents about two thirds of one standard deviation of the cross-sectional variation of DPI. The "California effect" in VC contract design is notably larger than any difference based on plausible proxies for agency and information problems (which conceptually should matter for contract design). As shown in Panel B, differences in company age, founder background, round amount and VC experience (number of investments) each amount to only about a half DPI unit. Although these proxies are all significant in the direction predicted by theory, their magnitude is about half of the "California effect".
We further explore whether the uniqueness of the California effect reflects a difference with a few other states or reflect a broader empirical pattern. As shown in appendix table A, the difference exists for 40 out of the 43 U.S. states that are represented in our sample (not counting California). Also, appendix table B
shows that the difference holds across all major industry groups and across sorts based on company age.
Panel C in table 3 shows that the differences between contracts are not due to one specific term but hold for four of the six cash flow contingencies that make up DPI. The VC attorney David K. Levine (of Snell and Wilmer LLP) confirms one of these finding: "[i]t may be a bit more common for VCs based on the East
Coast to require dividends that accrue (or cumulate) but such cumulative dividends provisions are quite rare in West Coast based deals." 14 We do not observe differences in liquidation preference, which is not surprising given that this contingency exhibits a low degree of cross-sectional variation.
Interestingly, we find that California contracts are more likely not to include entrepreneur-friendly payto-play provisions. While it is difficult to compare the real-world importance of different cash flow contingencies, the California difference for pay-to-play is relatively small compared to the difference for all other contingencies. Also, our interviews with VCs and lawyers suggest that pay-to-play is less important than the other contingencies because it only matters if VCs do not invest in follow-up rounds (which they typically do). We infer that even though California contracts have more investor-friendly pay-to-play provisions, the overall "California effect" is that VC contracts are less investor-friendly (thus more entrepreneur-friendly). Table 4A is a first multivariate exploration of the harshness of contract design. We run OLS regressions with DPI as the dependent variable and include all commonly used contract-theoretical variables as well as variables relating to the location of the company and the VC. All regression models also include industry and year fixed effects. The analysis confirms the results of the univariate comparison with a strong "California effect" on contract design. As shown in regression model 6, this effect seems to be larger for Silicon Valley-in other words, among California companies, Silicon Valley location provides an extra boost to the leniency of the contract.
Downside Protection Index, Multivariate Analysis
Downside Protection Index, Robustness
In un-tabulated regressions we conduct a variety of robustness of the "California effect". Our results on company and VC location are robust to limiting the sample to one observation per company and VC respectively. Our results are further robust to controlling for the pre-money valuation, which is a good proxy for unobserved company quality. We do not include pre-money valuation in our main specifications because it may be endogenously related to DPI (e.g., entrepreneurs trade off nicer terms against more favorable valuation). Our results on company and VC location hold after we include law firm fixed effects, and our results on company California location hold after we include lead VC fixed effects. The result of these fixed effect regressions shows that the "California effect" cannot be explained by law firms or VCs using standardized contract templates.
Downside Protection Index, Agency and Contract Theory Findings
Another part of table 4A confirms key variables predicted by contract theories, extending the Stromberg (2003, 2004) analysis to a much larger sample and presenting some new findings. Our first result, which has not previously been documented, is a persistent negative and significant correlation between contract harshness and amounts financed in that round. If money raised can be interpreted as a proxy for quality, then this finding shows that better quality firms receive better terms. This is consistent with several types of models;
in particular, if we assume that there is some competition for the better firms, less harsh contract terms will be a natural equilibrium outcome. This interpretation is supported by some empirical work. Nahata (2008) finds that companies that raise more funding are more likely to have a successful IPO or an acquisition exit.
Our second result is that successful serial founders receive less harsh contracts. This finding is significant only for companies financed by a non-California VC. A similar finding is presented by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, table 4 ) who show that serial founders get better liquidation rights (less harsh contracts, in our terminology). Venture-backed companies founded by more experienced entrepreneurs are also more likely to have a successful outcome (Gompers et al 2010) , and therefore require less downside protection.
Our third, and at first glance somewhat surprising, result is that older companies receive harsher contracts. Since our regressions control for various company characteristics and quality, as well as for VC characteristics, this result may be interpreted as requiring more downside protection for companies that had taken longer to mature, and by extension, can take longer to exit. This finding is also consistent with the result in Gompers et al (2010) that younger companies provide higher rates of return.
Our fourth finding is that contracts are less harsh for more experienced VCs. Bengtsson and Sensoy (2009) investigate this effect in detail. In their model, more experienced VCs optimally substitute contractual harshness with a better ability to monitor and perform non-contractual enforcement.
Downside Protection Index, VC Proximity and Exposure
While the "California effect" is also noted in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) for a much smaller sample, our data allow us to explore the question whether it applies to only California locations, or reflects a much broader contracting style. To this end, we create proxies that capture how closely related the lead VC is to the California market, in terms of either geographical proximity or prior investment exposure. 15 We use data from
VentureEconomics to create these proxies. Table 4B presents regression results that include the same control variables as in table 4A. In these models, the sample is restricted to companies that are headquartered outside California and have a lead VC that is also headquartered outside California. The advantage of these restrictions is discussed below. Regression model 1 shows that contracts are more investor-friendly if the VC is located further away from Silicon Valley.
In model 2, we include "VC California Investment Experience", which measures how many times the VC has previously invested in companies located in California. We find that VCs that have a greater prior California exposure are more likely to adopt a "California style" in VC contracting. We obtain a similar result in model 3
for "VC California Syndication Experience", which measures how many times the VC has previously invested in a round that was syndicated with a VC headquartered in California. These results show that the California contracting style is not only a one-state phenomenon, but also affects VCs who are physically close, or had more exposure, to California VC market. This is perhaps the most convincing piece of evidence that favors the explanation of a different contracting style in California as conjectured by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, p.299) .
Essentially, since the specifications in table 4B include only investments with non-California locations, we can rule out explanations related to any California-specific formal institution or company characteristics.
We can even go one step further and rule out that any state-specific factors explain the "California effect"-we find that our results remain qualitatively similar in specifications 4-6 where we include fixed effects based on both the company's and the lead VC's locations. Table 5 adds probit regressions where each separate cash flow contingencies in turn is the dependent variable.
Separate Cash Flow Contingencies
In addition to "Company in California", our independent variables include the full set of contract-theoretical control variables. We confirm the univariate results that contracts for California contracts are less likely to include cumulative dividends, participation, anti-dilution and redemption but more likely to include an 15 We note that a VC who ranks high on our California proximity and exposure variables may have a satellite office in California. Such office location should not affect any formal institutions or company characteristics when the VC invests in non-California companies. Our data does not include any information about satellite office locations.
investor-friendly version of pay-to-play provisions (i.e. no pay-to-play). Again, common contract theoretical variables, such as VC experience (number of investments), company age and round number matter as well.
California companies also raise larger amounts and receive financing from a greater number of VCs (models 7 and 8). These differences cannot explain our results on DPI because our regressions in table 4A control for round amount and number of VCs. Importantly, regression model 10 shows that the pre-money valuation is not higher for companies in California. These results indicate that the "California effect" in contract harshness is not explained by differences in company quality across geographical areas. We discuss this idea in more detail in section 7. We should also note that company age, round number and VC experience have similar sign and significance as they had in regressions for the overall index.
Downside Protection Index and VC Market Concentration
Our results thus far have demonstrated a significant cultural effect in VC contracts. However, it may be that the "California effect" can be attributed either to the concentration of VCs in California. Both of these issues have been explored in earlier work on other types of firms, but we are the first to study the role of market concentration on private equity contract design.
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We create a variable that measures the number of active VCs in the state where the company is located. active VCs in a state. We confirm this idea in multivariate regressions shown in table 6. We regress DPI on company, VC and round variables and also include a measure of VC concentration. VC concentration is positively correlated to DPI, regardless of whether it is measured by the number of active VCs in a state, the number of active VCs in a region (using the Census 9-region classification of the U.S. states), the number of venture-backed companies in a state-industry segment or the total dollar amount raised by venture-backed companies in a state-industry segment.
The result holds even after we control for whether the company or VC was located in California (models 3-6). Importantly, the coefficients on the California dummies remain negative and significant.
Companies that are located in California include fewer investor-friendly contract terms partly because there are more active VCs or more VC funding in this state, but other regional or cultural differences still seem to affect contract design. Put differently, the "California effect" can only partly be explained by a greater concentration of VCs in that state.
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Cash Flow Contingencies and Distance between Company and VC
Our final set of tests considers another aspect of the location effect on contract design, namely, whether the relative distance between company and VC also influences how contracts are written. Papers on soft information (see Stein, 2002 , Petersen and Rajan, 2002 , or Berger et al. 2005 , Petersen, 2004 or Uzzi, 1999 suggest that in the presence of soft information and monitoring costs, smaller local banks may be better suited to serve local customers. In our setting, if the VC and the entrepreneur are on close personal terms, they may only need the proverbial handshake rather than a complicated contract with harsh cash flow contingencies. The evidence in Lerner (1995) is consistent with the idea that distance affects how the VC interacts with their portfolio companies.
We first use a zip-code database to look up the longitude and latitude of the main office for each sample-company and VC, and then calculate distance in miles using the Haversine formula, which takes into account the curvature of the Earth.
Comparisons of average DPIs for different distances are found in table 7. As shown in panel A, DPI is lowest for companies that are at closer distance to the VC. The differences based on distance seem somewhat small, however, when we consider the "California effect", the picture becomes much clearer. In panel B we restrict our analysis to California companies. The average DPI is 4.55 if the VC is located outside California but only 4.25 if the VC is located in California. This result can be interpreted either as a distance result or as part of the "California effect" that we document. In panel C we restrict our analysis to non-California companies. Without any California connections, and if the company and the VC are from different states, contracts feature a harshness index of 5.48. If the company and the VC are in the same state, DPI drops to 5.29.
However, if out-of-state VC is located in California then DPI is 4.75, thus lower than for a same state VC.
These magnitudes imply that the "California effect" dominates the distance effect on VC contract design. Table 8 confirms the distance results in a multivariate setting. Regression models 1-5 include sample companies located in California and models 6-10 to companies located in other states. The regressions are similar to those presented in table 4A and include all controls used previously, but for space considerations we only show the distance variables and the company California location dummy. The "California effect" is as significant as it is in table 4A. However, distance seems to be important as well. 17 In untabulated regressions, we include square measures of our variables that capture VC and company concentration. The coefficients on the California dummies remain significant after controlling for such potential non-linearity between DPI and VC/company concentration.
Other Contract Dimensions and the "California Effect"
Control Rights
Although the focus of our study is on cash flow contingencies, we also have data on control rights for some of the contracts in our sample. These control rights are board seats, which give the VCs residual decision rights, and covenants (i.e. protective provisions), which, similar to debt covenants, give VCs the right to veto specific decisions. Because control right become very complex in follow-up VC contracts, we limit our attention to first round contracts only.
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This sub-sample includes 285 contracts with the necessary information regarding covenants, as well as data on the allocation of board seats between VCs (preferred shareholders) and other (common) shareholders. Table 9 presents regressions with different measures of control rights as dependent variables. We include, but do not report, the same battery of control variables in these regression models as in our previous tests.
Regression model 1 shows that contracts for California companies are less likely to include investorfriendly covenants, which give the VC veto rights over important financial and operational decisions. We also test for each covenant separately and note that the California dummy was negative throughout and several of the most important cases show statistical significance. In particular, they include the right to issue more debt, the right to sell assets, change the company's business model and to engage in an inside transaction. The only covenant that is more likely for California companies is the right to issue junior preferred equity. In regression models 14-15 we relate the VC's control over the board of directors to the company's California location. We find that California contracts are less likely to receive a board majority (although this result is only weakly significant).
These results on control rights are important because they demonstrate that the "California effect" does not reflect a substitution between cash flow and control rights. VCs who finance California companies do not agree to fewer investor-friendly cash flow contingencies in order to compensate for more investor-friendly control rights. Our findings also further support that the "California effect" reflects a broad pattern of less investor-friendly contract design.
CEO Compensation Contracts
We next explore whether the design of executive compensation contracts in venture-backed companies is also subject to geographical variation. Because the mandatory legal filings that make up our contract dataset are 18 In a follow-up VC contracts, the allocation of decision rights depend on how many board seats and covenants are given to VCs investing in the current round and to those investing in earlier rounds. For example, suppose a follow-up VC contract give the investing VCs no board seats or covenants. This would not mean that these VCs have no control rights because they could have received sufficient board seats and covenants in an earlier round contract.. agreements between shareholders, they do not include any information about salaries and bonuses. 2007 (last year for which we have data). Importantly, although the surveys provide information on a broad range of compensation-relevant variables for each sample company, they do not disclose the company's identity. We therefore cannot match our compensation dataset with our contract dataset. However, the size and breadth of both datasets mean that there likely is to be considerable overlap in coverage. We explain only the cash portion of CEO compensation contracts. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) study equity incentives for entrepreneurs and show that contracts from California include weaker performance-based equity incentives for entrepreneurs. Similar to our findings on control rights, these results on compensation are important because they demonstrate that the "California effect" does not reflect a substitution between less harsh cash flow contingencies in investment contracts and tougher executive compensation contracts.
California companies are less harsh for both types of contracts.
Discussion of the "California Effect" and Further Robustness Checks
Differences in Legal Institutions
Unlike studies that compare financial contract design across countries, all companies and VCs in our sample are located in the U.S. This means that our results cannot be explained by differences in tax code, bankruptcy procedures, legal infrastructure and enforcement of financial contracts. Interviews with legal scholars and practicing VC lawyers confirm this view. A substantial part of contract enforcement depends on which U.S.
state the company has chosen for its legal incorporation. Broughman and Fried (2010) provide evidence that the state of incorporation can matter for the enforcement of contractual terms in VC investments. They study only California-based companies and show that the voting rights and fiduciary duties are somewhat different between Delaware and California incorporations. Importantly, these legal differences do not explain our results. In un-tabulated robustness tests we include the state of incorporation in our regressions of DPI on locations. We find that our results pertaining to California locations remain unchanged in such regression models, and that DPI does not vary with the state of incorporation. This strengthens our belief that legal differences (or differences in how contract terms are reported in the mandatory legal filings we study) cannot explain the large "California effect" that we document.
To the best of our knowledge, the only potentially relevant institutional difference between U.S. states is the ability to enforce non-compete clauses in employment contracts. Such contracts are notably more difficult to enforce in California courts. Although there is no direct relationship between non-competes and the contract terms we study, it is theoretically possible that there could exist some substitution between these features. This difference in non-competes, however, is very unlikely to explain our results because we also find that contracts are less harsh in Silicon Valley, for which state laws are identical to other California locations.
Also, between-state differences in the enforcement of non-competes cannot explain why after controlling for company location, we observe a differences based on VC location and VC exposure to the California market.
Differences in Company Quality
Another possible explanation for the "California effect" is that this particular geographical area attracts the best entrepreneurs and the best ideas, which could be associated with less harsh VC contracts. This reason is behaviorally equivalent to a "California effect". However, it is not likely to explain our findings. First, all our multivariate tests include a number of important control variables, such as company industry and age, founder experience, investment amount, and VC experience. All these variables, and in particular the last two controls are likely to absorb various aspects of company quality-better companies raise more VC financing and match with more experienced VCs. As discussed in section 4, the "California effect" is larger than the coefficient on any observable company, founder or VC characteristic. Secondly, our analysis of other deal dimensions in 
Differences in Regional Style
Conversations with VCs and attorneys specializing on VC contracts trying to gauge the source of the "California effect" seem to point to a geographical dispersion of opinions which is not tied to specific legal institutions or differences in company quality. Quotes from two reputable VC attorneys illustrate the industry perception that there are important regional differences in contract design. Eduardo C. LeFevre (of Foley and Lardner LLP) says: "There is also a growing awareness of the differences between "East Coast" and "West
Coast" financings, primarily with respect to regional differences in valuation, liquidation preference, and number of later stage financings". Alan Bickerstaff (of Andrews Kurth LLP) adds: "The terms of VC financings are fairly customary, with nuances unique to each deal and geographic region. For example, East
Coast VCs tend to require founders personally to make certain representations and warranties whereas this practice is virtually nonexistent in West Coast deals." 20 In fact, a VC attorney told us that when the National Venture Capital Association tried to come up with a common template for VC contract provisions, "Western"
VCs thought that what "Eastern" VCs were proposing was way too harsh. These practitioner explanations agree with the thrust of Saxenian's (1996) argument that regional styles play an important role in how local VC markets operate. This type of framework is also consistent with the management styles idea (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, and Schoar 2007) , although our effect applies to a geographical region and not an individual.
Conclusions
This paper shows that style based geographical elements can form an essential component of private equity contract design in addition to more traditional determinants such as information and agency problems, and legal and other formal institutions. We also find support for the role of various contract theoretical variables, including some that we study for the first time in the VC context.
The "California effect" we document is economically and statistically very significant. Its economic importance follows from the effect of cash flow contingencies on the entrepreneur's incentives and the pricing of VC investments. We show that contracts involving California companies or California VCs include considerably fewer investor-friendly cash flow contingencies. Indeed, this regional difference is larger than any difference based on a plausible contract determinant, such as investment size, founder background or VC reputation.
We show that the "California effect" cannot be explained by state-wide differences in formal institutions, or by differences in company quality. Importantly, unlike studies of cross-country differences in private equity contracts (See Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg, 2007; Bottazzi, DaRin, and Hellmann, 2008) , we document our patterns in the U.S. VC market.
Although market concentration and distance also influence the harshness of VC contracts, the "California effect" remains strong after controlling for them. We also reject the idea that the relative California friendliness of cash flow rights is traded off against harsher control rights or more performance-based CEO compensation contracts. In fact, we find that California contracts provide weaker control rights to VCs and less performance-based CEO compensation.
In conclusion, our findings show that even though VCs are sophisticated investors, geographic-based style is very important in contract formation. Pay-To-Play: Specifies what contractual rights that the investor loses if he does not invest in a follow-up financing round of the company. With "Convert to Preferred" the investor loses some contractual rights (typically anti-dilution rights) that are attached to his preferred stock. With "Convert to Common" the investor loses all contractual rights that are attached to his preferred stock.
Liquidation Preference:
The multiple of the investor's investment that is paid back to the investor when the company is sold or liquidated. Liquidation preference is senior to common stock.
See Table 1 Participation: With participation the investor receives both a liquidation preference and a fraction of common stock when the company is sold or liquidated. With "Capped" participation the investor only receives the liquidation preference if his investment IRR is below a certain hurdle. With no participation the investor holds convertible preferred stock.
Anti-Dilution:
The investor is issued additional shares if the company raises a new financing round at a lower valuation than what the investor paid (down round). "Full Ratchet" gives the investor more additional shares than "Weighted Average", especially if the new financing round is small.
Redemption:
The investor has the right to sell his shares back to the company after a specified time period. A typical redemption right provision gives the investor the right to sell back 1/3 of his shares after 5 years, 1/3 after 6 years and the remaining 1/3 after 7 years. 
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